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American Hegemony:
The View from Australia
Mark Beeson
Australia and the United States have been extremely close allies since World
War II. The engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have continued this tradi-
tion. Yet even before the bombings in Bali and the confrontation with Iraq,
an important debate about the costs and benefits of the relationship with the
United States was underway in Australia. At a number of levels—economic,
political, and even strategic—increasing numbers of Australians were critically
reassessing the relationship and questioning the supposed benefits. Recent
events have accelerated this process and thrown the relationship into even
starker relief. This paper argues that the increasingly unilateral nature of
American economic and strategic policy is imposing major costs on even its
most loyal allies, a situation that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of, and
support for, U.S. hegemony.
When the United States declared war on terrorism in the after-math of September 11, the first country to offer unequivo-
cal, open-ended support was Australia. Even before it was clear
what form this war might take, or who the principal adversaries
might be, Australian policymakers were anxious to reestablish the
country as America’s most dependable ally. That Australia might
show such enthusiasm for a struggle that did not directly impinge
on its own security is unsurprising. Since World War II, when the
United States replaced Great Britain as Australia’s principal “great
and powerful friend” and ostensible security guarantor, Australian
political elites have been at pains to ensure that the United States
remains favorably disposed toward its importunate ally. In Korea,
Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and most recently Iraq,
Australians have been prominent players in supporting casts that
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were generally of greater moral than military value. But in the af-
termath of the Bali bombing last October, in which Australians
appeared to be deliberately targeted among the Western enemies
of radical Islam, doubts have begun to emerge about the relative
costs and benefits of a close alliance with America. A number of
commentators, including leading religious figures, have claimed
that Australia’s high profile support of America’s war on terror has
actually endangered Australian security by making the country a
more likely target of terrorism.1
The U.S. relationship, once the bedrock of Australian secu-
rity, is becoming a lightening rod for an emerging policy debate
in Australia. A number of key issues—trade policy, relations with
Australia’s Asian neighbours, and security—have long been staples
of domestic politics. But the U.S. conduct of the war on terror,
culminating recently in its invasion of Iraq, has become a more
prominent part of the debate. It is also important to recognize, as
I shall illustrate below, that even before the Bali bombings, U.S.-
Australian relations were already becoming the subject of increased
discussion; Bali has simply thrown such issues into even sharper
relief.
Security in an Anxious Nation
The dynamics of the U.S.-Australian relationship and the willing-
ness of generations of Australian politicians to give such unques-
tioning loyalty to it cannot be understood without reference to
Australia’s unique strategic position and history. Its geographical
location and status as a moderate power ought to make it envi-
able rather than anxious. An island continent, Australia is argu-
ably more naturally secure than any other part of the planet. And
yet, from its inception Australians have felt anxious about their
supposed isolation and fretted about the potential threat posed by
the far more populous nations of Asia to their north.2
During the heyday of the Asian economic “miracle,” it
seemed that attitudes toward the region might be fundamentally
transformed. Sadly, the financial crisis, subsequent political tur-
bulence, and now the Bali bombings in particular have under-
mined this more positive view, and there is renewed talk of an “arc
of instability” to Australia’s north.3 Yet none of the countries of
Southeast Asia has the military capacity to threaten mainland Aus-
tralia directly. Even China, which is generally regarded as the most
likely threat to regional stability, and which harbors ambitions to
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become a more assertive regional power, hardly looms as a source
of danger to Australia. The recent terrorist outrage in Bali notwith-
standing, and despite local politicians working themselves into a
somewhat belated lather about homeland security, by world stan-
dards Australia still looks like a comparatively secure place.
Indeed, if any country was well placed to reap the much dis-
cussed peace dividend expected from the end of the Cold War, it
ought to have been Australia. Yet even before Bali, defense was the
one area of government spending insulated from the budget cuts
that have dominated the policy agenda of current Prime Minister
John Howard’s government.
Two historical factors explain the continuing importance of
defense spending. First, as mentioned above, rather than seeing
their isolation as a unique strategic asset, generations of Austra-
lian policymakers have seen it as a liability. Consequently, shoring
up a strategic relationship with Britain, and more recently the
United States, has been the enduring bedrock of Australian politics
and foreign policy shared by both ends of the political spectrum.
The second influence on Australia’s overall defense posture
is of more recent vintage. John Howard’s coalition government
came to power in 1996 promising to “reinvigorate” ties with the
United States. Its predecessor—the Australian Labor Party (ALP),
under the leadership of Paul Keating—had given greater priority
to deepening economic, political, and even strategic ties with Asia.
Howard, by contrast, explicitly repudiated closer regional relations
in favor of stronger U.S.-Australia bilateral ties.
Howard’s desire for closer U.S. ties reflected a personal am-
bivalence about the whole “Asian engagement” project and a genuine
enthusiasm about America itself. Although Howard’s paeans to
American leadership
and the depth of
Australia’s friend-
ship were off-put-
ting to some, they
reflected a warmth
toward the United
States that is widely
shared by much of
Australia’s political
elite. Indeed, surveys generally indicate that a majority of Austra-
lians believe the strategic alliance with the United States in some
way guarantees Australia’s security.4
Surveys generally indicate that a
majority of Australians believe
the strategic alliance with the
United States in some way
guarantees Australia’s security.
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Why is the strategic relationship with the United States con-
sidered so pivotal, especially by the Howard government? In part
this reflects the ambiguous nature of the defense relationship en-
shrined in the ANZUS treaty of 1951, which originally included
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.  Not only has
ANZUS been undermined by the expulsion of New Zealand follow-
ing its refusal to allow potentially nuclear-armed American vessels
to use its ports, but it contains no iron-clad guarantee of Ameri-
can assistance in the event of an attack on Australia. Consequently,
generations of Australian policymakers have felt compelled to
demonstrate their commitment to the strategic relationship by
signing up for any conflict America found itself involved in—no
matter how peripheral it might be to Australia’s direct security in-
terests.5
The real glue that holds the strategic alliance between the
United States and Australia together, however, is not the ANZUS
Treaty, but the so-called joint facilities. These intelligence gather-
ing and communications installations are scattered around Aus-
tralia, controlled by Americans, and an integral part of the U.S.
military’s command and control systems. Not only did such op-
erations make an otherwise strategically insignificant Australia a
prime nuclear target during the Cold War, but successive Austra-
lian governments accepted a compromised national sovereignty,
acquiescing to an agreement that gave them no control over, or any
right to be informed
about, the communica-
tions passing through
the bases.6 The justifi-
cation for this situation
has always been that
Australia gains invalu-
able intelligence as a
consequence of the re-
lationship. Whatever
the merits of this argu-
ment—it is impossible
to judge, as such information is always considered too sensitive for
public scrutiny—the Australian government’s apparent failure to
act upon U.S. intelligence in the period before the Bali attack raises
questions about both the competence of the Australian govern-
ment and the overall utility of this sort of information.7 The more
general point to emphasize is that there have always been signifi-
For a country with no obvious
enemies, the main threats to
Australian security since
World War II have,
paradoxically enough, actually
resulted from its U.S. alliance.
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cant potential costs for Australia in maintaining the alliance with
the United States. For a country with no obvious enemies, the main
threats to Australian security since World War II have, paradoxi-
cally enough, actually resulted from its U.S. alliance.
Post-Bali, when strategic issues have assumed an unaccus-
tomed prominence in public debates, Howard has had an increas-
ingly difficult task in justifying his emphasis on ties with the
United States. He needs to be able to demonstrate to skeptical do-
mestic critics that there are identifiable benefits rather than just
obligations and risks flowing from such a relationship. It is prov-
ing to be an increasingly difficult task in the face of developments
in the Asian region and trade tensions between Australia and the
United States.
Trade Troubles
At the top of John Howard’s wish list on his most recent visits to
the United States has been a bilateral free trade agreement. Aus-
tralia is somewhat unusual in that it is a developed economy, but
one that remains highly dependent on agricultural and natural
resource exports. Like other developed economies, Australia has
seen a rapid rise in the service sector and a decline in the relative
importance of agriculture, but its exports remain dominated by
primary products like coal, crude petroleum, iron ore, wool, wheat,
and meat. This in itself has meant an inexorable historical decline
in Australia’s terms of trade as the value of commodities relative
to manufactures and (some) services has continued to fall. Conse-
quently, simply maintaining its trade position means that Australia
needs to export greater quantities of primary products to satisfy
its appetite for the sort of manufactured goods it does not pro-
duce itself. Since primary good sectors remain some of the most
heavily protected sectors of the international economy, Australian
exporters face an array of tariff barriers and subsidies that make
it increasingly difficult for them to survive.
Recent U.S. trade policy has only exacerbated this problem
and fueled widespread resentment in Australia, making the posi-
tion of staunch allies like Howard increasingly uncomfortable.
Most recently, the U.S. decision to subsidize its domestic agricul-
ture to the tune of some $180 billion sent an unequivocal signal
to U.S. allies and competitors alike that, when it comes to eco-
nomic policy, unilateralism and national self-interest rule. In a
move the Economist described as “lunacy” and a fundamental blow
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to further multilateral trade liberalization,8 the United States ef-
fectively scuppered any realistic hopes the Howard government
might have harbored




dent set by its earlier
decision to impose 30
percent tariff barriers
on steel imports—a




leader of the National
Party, John Anderson,
described the United States as arrogant, and declared  “We see our-
selves as allies, but such measures reek of, ‘Do as I say, not as I
do.’”9
The difficulties are not just economic. John Howard’s pre-
dominantly urban Liberal Party is in a coalition government with
the rural-based National Party. Although the Nationals are the jun-
ior party, they represent precisely the sort of people who have been
most badly affected by recent U.S. policy. A free trade agreement
would go some way toward placating the disaffected constituency
in “the Bush,” while simultaneously shoring up support for the
alliance with the United States. But the realities of domestic poli-
tics in America—especially the pivotal electoral importance of the
farm lobby—mean that the only sort of bilateral deal Australia is
likely to strike with the United States would be one that excludes
agriculture. Such an agreement would be extremely difficult to sell
in Australia and would further enrage Australian farmers.
U.S. actions are especially galling because the United States
is actually Australia’s largest single source of imports, and runs a
major trade surplus with Australia—about two to one in America’s
favor in the merchandise goods sector, as Figure 1 indicates.10 The
U.S. initiatives on farm subsidies and steel tariffs will not only
make this trade balance more difficult for Australia to turn
around, but may jeopardize other “traditional” Australian markets
at the same time as America’s subsidized exports become more
competitive.11 Although Australian officials subsequently managed
The U.S. decision to subsidize
its domestic agriculture to the
tune of some $180 billion sent
an unequivocal signal to U.S.
allies and competitors alike
that, when it comes to
economic policy, unilateralism
and national self-interest rule.
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to achieve a slightly more favorable deal on steel, the fundamen-
tal point remained: the United States was not committed to mul-
tilateral trade outcomes, nor wedded to trade liberalization as a
major priority. For Australia, both farm subsidies and steel tariffs
have worrying implications and threaten to undercut the entire
basis of Australian trade diplomacy for the preceding twenty years.








backs. What is most
significant about current Australian policy, and what places a
greater burden of expectation on the relationship as a consequence,
is the Howard government’s explicit linking of security and eco-
nomic issues. As the government’s recently released White Paper
puts it,  “a free trade agreement with the United States [is] a pow-
erful opportunity to put our economic relationship on a parallel
Figure 1: Australia’s Merchandise Trade
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Source: ABS data on the DFAT STARS database.
The United States was not
committed to multilateral trade
outcomes, nor wedded to trade
liberalization as a major priority.
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footing to our political relationship, which is manifest in the
ANZUS alliance.”12 A failure to deliver a meaningful free trade
agreement in such circumstances will fundamentally undermine
the legitimacy of the relationship.
The Asian Connection
Asia has loomed large in the minds of generations of Australian
policymakers as a complex source of threats and opportunities. For
much of Australia’s brief history, the region to its north has been
a source of high anxiety, an anxiety fueled by racist stereotypes and
misunderstandings that have made relations with the diverse coun-
tries of the region inherently problematic. Over the last three or
four decades, however, the remarkable economic transformation
that has occurred in the newly industrializing countries of East
Asia has driven a major reorientation of Australia’s economic re-
lations and a concomitant attempt to engage with the region more
effectively at a political and cultural level.
Although close ties with the United States have generally en-
joyed the support of both the conservative coalition governments
and their opponents in the ALP—currently the major non-govern-
ment party in Australia—the latter’s pursuit of closer relations with
Asia rather than the United States encouraged a rethinking of eco-
nomic and foreign policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. Under
Paul Keating’s leadership the reality of Australia’s growing eco-
nomic ties with Asia provided the rationale for a fundamental shift
in policy. Keating gave greater priority to deepening economic,
political, and even strategic ties with Asia. Australia’s security was
to be reinforced by reaching out to its Asian neighbors rather than
warding them off.
One of the most important diplomatic initiatives developed
under the former ALP regime was the Asia Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) forum.13 From an Australian perspective, APEC
had a number of potential benefits. First, it could give Australia
insider status in a region where its colonial history, Anglo-Celtic
heritage, and monocultural image meant it has always been re-
garded as something of an outsider. Second, it not only gave Australia
direct institutional linkages to the region, but offered Australia the
chance to export its preferred economic vision: securing Australia’s
economic position by opening up and liberalizing Asian markets.
Indeed, the development of closer economic ties with Asia was seen
as so important in the late 1980s that former Labor leader Bob
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Hawke’s original proposal did not even include the United States.
But for much of East Asia, the prospect of developing a regional
organization to promote deeper economic integration was of little
interest if it excluded the critically important U.S. market.
The inclusion of the United States in APEC was not neces-
sarily a bad thing for Australia: clearly, an APEC that included the
United States had the potential to be far more significant than an
APEC without it. The United States, as a fellow advocate of trade
and financial liberalization and other neoliberal reforms, might
have been expected to be a formidable ally for Australia’s own pros-
elytizing efforts. Such expectations, however, were never realized.
Apart from the occasional flurry of interest under the Clinton ad-
ministration, America has been, at best, a tepid supporter of APEC,
judging that it could achieve more through direct bilateral pres-
sure on countries like Japan than it ever could through APEC’s
notoriously ineffective consensual style and voluntarist approach
to trade liberalization.
APEC’s increasing irrelevance and ineffectiveness has impor-
tant implications for Australia’s relations with the United States
and with Asia. Australian politicians partially blame the United
States for APEC’s fate. Former Prime Minister Keating—one of
APEC’s most ardent champions—described the U.S. decision to al-
low Russia to join as an “act of economic vandalism.”14 Russia’s
inclusion further diluted APEC’s attenuated identity and purpose,
which already encompassed East Asia, the Americas, and
Australasia. APEC’s gradual decline left the centerpiece of
Australia’s regional diplomatic efforts in tatters.
In the aftermath of the financial and political crises that
swept through East Asia from 1997 onwards, Australia has thus
been largely sidelined in the regional initiatives that may well re-
define East Asian relations. The most significant initiative has been
the emergence of the ASEAN + 3 grouping, which includes Japan,
China, and South Korea, in addition to the original members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.15 When originally
touted as an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) by Malaysia’s
Prime Minister Mahathir in the early 1990s, the United States ve-
hemently opposed the idea—something that ensured a lack of Japa-
nese support and its consequent failure. At the time, this seemed
like a good outcome for Australia, as it nullified EAEC’s potential
threat to APEC. Recently, however, the United States has softened
its opposition to a regional political and economic grouping from
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which it is excluded, allowing ASEAN + 3 to gain momentum. Aus-
tralia has not been invited or attempted to join what looks likely












this is a bus that Australia seems to have missed. Interestingly, the
most pro-American members of the cabinet—Howard and foreign
minister Alexander Downer—have been blamed for this major long-
term policy failure.17
While the Howard government’s Labor predecessors could be
criticized for placing excessively high hopes on APEC as a vehicle
for transforming Australia’s relationship with East Asia, they had
the merit of being part of a larger strategy of general engagement
with the region. The inescapable reality is that about half of
Australia’s overall exports go to East Asia and only 10 percent to
the United States.18 Ironically enough, it has generally proved easier
for Australian exporters to break into the supposedly protected
markets of East Asia than it has to penetrate the heartland of free
market liberal capitalism.
The Howard government, however, seems not to have heeded
this reality. Far from scrambling to find new ways to strengthen
ties with Asia, it has actually contributed to a deterioration of re-
lations. In the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the Howard govern-
ment declared itself the “strong man of Asia,” and suggested that
Australia’s relative immunity to the crisis was a vindication of its
own policies. Not only did such remarks appear insensitive and win
few friends in East Asia, but Australian policymakers have subse-
quently gone out of their way to distance themselves from any
emerging regional institutions on the grounds of cultural incom-
patibility—a position that reveals a naïve understanding of the cul-
tural and historical complexity of East Asia, but which helps to
explain the enduring affinity with the United States.19
Though the Howard government has
belatedly taken an interest in ASEAN
+ 3, declaring that it would be
“pleased” to be involved, this is a bus
that Australia seems to have missed.
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The Howard government has effectively locked itself out of
closer regional ties in favor of an alignment with the United States
that delivers few immediate benefits. But, as East Asian economies
pick themselves up off the canvas, and as American capitalism con-
tinues to be plagued by corruption scandals and skittish stock
markets, the triumphalism and hubris that characterized the post-
crisis period in both the United States and Australia is starting to
look premature and misplaced. If East Asia manages to develop fi-
nancial mechanisms that make it less prone to crisis and trade re-
gimes that make it less dependent on American markets, Australian
policymakers may be forced to reassess their priorities. In short,
despite the importance of the economic relationship between Aus-
tralia and the United States, brute geography coupled with the
long-term prospects of East Asia generally and of China in particu-
lar, suggest that the region will remain of paramount economic
importance to Australia. The continuing primacy the Howard gov-
ernment attaches to the U.S. relationship,20 however, means that
achieving a similarly strong political relationship with the region
will be one of the defining challenges of the next few decades.
The Evolving Debate in Australia
There is a certain inevitability about continuing debates over the
relative importance of Asia and America, and one not based solely
on the cyclical fortunes of Anglo-American and East Asian forms
of capitalism. Generational change in Australian politics will in-
evitably encourage a reassessment of current policy settings. John
Howard was born just prior to the outbreak of World War II, and
for his generation, the American alliance has always been the foun-
dation of Australia’s security and foreign policy. The demise of
Britain as a global power, the Cold War, and a lingering nervous-
ness about the looming masses of Asia, all combined to give
America a central place in Australian policymaking. However, Aus-
tralia is being steadily transformed by migration: today, 23 percent
of Australians were born overseas and 5 percent of all Australians
were born in Asia.21 The concerns that shaped the attitudes of earlier
generations have less resonance for a rising generation with no
memory of the Cold War and a greater familiarity with Asia. Atti-
tudinal and policy change in such circumstances is unsurprising.
What is surprising, is that the debate about U.S.-Australia
relations has been led not by radical critics of American hegemony,
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of which there are relatively few, but by some of the most conser-
vative members of Australian society. Representatives of Australia’s
rural sector, for example, have even suggested that the joint facili-
ties should be used as bargaining chips in trade negotiations with
the United States. It is a measure of the continuing importance
attached to the alliance that this possibility is never likely to ma-
terialize. However, that it should be proposed at all by one of the
most conservative elements of Australian society is indicative of the
animosity that has been generated by the twin forces of American
protectionism and the long-term decline in the competitive posi-
tion of agriculture.
More dispassionate observers are also shifting their ground
and developing more critical stances toward the alliance; the new
leader of the ALP, Simon Crean, in his first major statement on
the future direction of foreign policy in April 2002, argued that
Australia’s position should not be “a pale shadow of America’s,”
and that under a future Labor administration, closer relations with
China would be a “key building block” of its approach to the re-
gion in particular.22 Hence, the uncritical bipartisan commitment
to the alliance was already beginning to fracture in the face of
short-term pain caused by the trade relationship, regional politi-
cal tensions, and a suspicion that some of the longer-term benefits
are less compelling than they once were. The confrontation with
Iraq and the perception that there is political advantage in oppos-
ing American plans has helped entrench such views in the ALP.
However, given the volatile nature of the electorate on this issue,
things could change.23 Much will depend on the highly unpredict-
able aftermath of the war.
Another focus of attention for those questioning the benefits
of Australia’s alliance with the United States is the potentially cen-
tral role that the joint facilities could play in the proposed U.S.
national missile defense system (NMD). Doubts about its feasibil-
ity and concern over its destabilizing impact have created divisions
within the normal bipartisan support for the security alliance. The
ALP, for example, has suggested it will review the NMD system
when it is eventually reelected, on the basis that NMD is “likely to
fuel a new nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region.”24 Most
notable in Labor’s emerging attitude to both the region and the
United States is not only that it marks a turning away from the
latter back toward the former, but that Labor judges there may be
political mileage in doing so. While Australia’s parliamentary de-
bates are notoriously colorful and robust, the portrayal of Prime
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Minister Howard by a leading opposition figure as an “arse-licker”
who sold out Australian interests on his most recent visit to Wash-
ington in return for a “pat on the head” from his American hosts,
captures the contemporary mood of at least a substantial minor-
ity of the electorate in Australia.25 Somewhat surprisingly,
Howard’s personal approval ratings have remained high thus far,
despite 76 percent of Australians being opposed to military action
in Iraq without a United Nations mandate.26 Indeed, once hostili-
ties commenced, there was a noteworthy swing of support toward
the government and the war in Iraq.27
Even within Howard’s own conservative side of Australian
politics, a growing unease about the possible implications of closer
alignment had emerged well before the Bali bombings. Malcolm
Fraser, one of Howard’s predecessors as both prime minister and
leader of the Liberal Party, has drawn attention to what he sees as
the potentially negative impact that a greater reliance on, and iden-
tification with, the United States may have for Australia’s regional
position. The United States’s global perspective and its recently
restated commitment toward Taiwan has increased the likelihood
of conflict with China. Unlikely as such a scenario may be, Fraser
argues, “it would be an act of lunacy for Australia to participate
in a conflict between China and America over Taiwan.”28 Yet
Australia’s current open-ended commitment to American foreign
policy locks it into security policies that may yield little direct ben-
efit, while necessitating major defense spending to ensure the com-
patibility of Australia’s armed forces with American strategic ob-
jectives.29 Even more important in the longer term, it complicates
Australia’s regional relations.
China, for example, fre-
quently complains that Australia
is little more than an American
puppet. Such criticisms from a
potential challenger to American
hegemony are predictable
enough given China’s desire to
undermine U.S. regional domi-
nance. And yet, the perception
that Australia is little more than
an extension of American for-
eign policy has been reinforced
by Australia itself. In the wake of its successful peacekeeping op-
erations in Timor—in which the United States conspicuously re-
The perception that
Australia is little more
than an extension of
American foreign policy
has been reinforced by
Australia itself.
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fused to play a significant role, despite requests from its suppos-
edly key ally30—John Howard suggested that this intervention provided
a successful exemplar of a new relationship, in which Australia
could deputize for America in smaller scale regional trouble
spots.31
In the aftermath of Bali, unquestioning support for American
actions, especially against Iraq where the threat to Australia is far
from obvious, has noticeably diminished. Yet even before the Bali
bombing, a number of Australia’s most senior public figures—in-
cluding three former prime ministers—had urged Howard not to
support U.S. actions without a mandate from the United Na-
tions.32  ALP leader Crean argued that it was important that Aus-
tralia not be seen as America’s “lap dog” in blindly supporting
American action against Iraq.33 After Bali, even Howard, conscious
of growing public disquiet about the government’s strategic pri-
orities, suggested that Australia’s “own patch” and a predomi-
nantly regional focus must now be the priority—though given his
role in shoring up the “coalition of the willing,” it can be assumed
that such comments were primarily for domestic consumption in
the immediate aftermath of the attacks.34
Howard has expended much political capital in support of
the alliance and a great deal hinges, therefore, on the manner in
which the confrontation with Iraq is resolved, both domestically
and internationally. Domestically, Howard is acting without popular
support—something that indicates the depth of his own personal
commitment to the U.S. relationship. Internationally, the stakes
are even higher: not only may Australia itself become a more
prominent target of terrorist attacks,35 but Australia’s position in
the region is made increasingly difficult as a consequence of its
prominent role in a war on terror that has encompassed South-
east Asia. Howard’s blanket support of American policy rankled in
some quarters, but his endorsement of the doctrine of preemption,
coupled with the suggestion that Australia might follow suit in
certain circumstances, sparked real outrage across the region.36
Some of this has come from the usual suspects, like Malaysia’s
Prime Minister Mahathir, but it has also included Indonesia and
even the Philippines.
American Hegemony and its Implications for U.S. Allies
American power is now routinely described as unparalleled in the
modern era. U.S. leadership in a range of economic, political, cul-
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tural, and especially military affairs gives it a preeminence that can
accurately be described as hegemonic. The capacity to shape the
rules and norms that increasingly govern a multi-dimensional in-
ternational sphere, or simply to ignore those regulations or insti-
tutions it dislikes, is a manifestation of a uniquely American power.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of America’s domi-
nance of the international system, especially since the Cold War
ended, has been the absence of challengers to its position, or even
of serious attempts to balance against its power. As John Ikenberry
has persuasively argued, American hegemony has proved remark-
ably durable because it appeared to provide widespread benefits,
depriving allies and potential adversaries of compelling reasons to
challenge its supremacy.37 Yet, as the events of September 11 re-
mind us, there has also been a perception that this U.S.-led inter-
national order has benefited some more than others. At a time
when America stands at the apex of a system that is seen to do little
to address global inequality, it is easy for critics of the United
States to depict American hegemony as self-serving and far from
benign.
It is in precisely such circumstances that supportive allies can
play a crucial role in dispelling the notions that American power
is deployed primarily to
promote American inter-
ests and that it is inimical
to a sustainable, collabora-
tive world order. Yet
friend and foe alike have
been alarmed by the re-
cent U.S. determination to
take an independent, uni-
lateral path. Whether it is
the withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol, the re-
fusal to sign on to the In-
ternational Criminal
Court, the overturning of
arms control agreements,
or the more prosaic will-
ingness to use its eco-
nomic and political
muscle to achieve goals that further national, rather than interna-
tional interests, there is much that is disquieting about the recent
Even in Australia the chorus
of concern is growing
increasingly louder. If
doubts about the benefits of
U.S. leadership exist within
what has traditionally been
the most uncritical of
American allies, it augurs
badly for the wider
legitimacy and durability of
American dominance.
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use of American power. Even in Australia the chorus of concern is
growing increasingly louder. If doubts about the benefits of U.S.
leadership exist within what has traditionally been the most un-
critical of American allies, it augurs badly for the wider legitimacy
and durability of American dominance.
Ironically, the contemporary international order that Ameri-
can hegemony helped construct, which has made the likelihood of
war between individual nations increasingly remote, arguably
makes direct dependence on and support for the United States less
essential than ever before. Australia has always been relatively im-
mune from invasion; the contemporary geopolitical order means
that conventional threats are almost unimaginable. Unstinting
support for a dominant power that is well able to look after itself,
and which is not averse to using its power to pursue its own in-
terests at the expense of its nominal allies is, therefore, increasingly
difficult to defend, other than on emotional grounds. And yet it
is precisely this unquantifiable but fundamental emotional aspect
of hegemonic power that is currently being undermined by the
more unilateralist and insular elements of American policy.
The crucial lesson to be drawn from the Australian experi-
ence is that even the most reliable allies can waver in the face of
intense domestic pressures. Australia’s prominent place in the
“coalition of the willing” confronting Iraq has proved deeply un-
popular in Australia and undermined support for the U.S.-Australian
alliance among the general population and within the opposition
ALP, which sees political advantage in criticizing both U.S. policy
and the current Bush administration. Thus, for the first time since
the Vietnam era, a close association with the United States has be-
come a political liability in Australia. This subjects the entire bi-
lateral relationship to an unaccustomed degree of critical scrutiny.
In such circumstances, when the possible costs of the alliance are
plain, but the benefits are controversial and difficult to demon-
strate, the crucial normative component of U.S. dominance—in
which allies willingly accede to American leadership—risks
unravelling.
Although America can easily do without the support of allies
like Australia, there are plainly advantages in not acting unilater-
ally. As Stanley Hoffman has pointed out, the United States may
not need to be bound by international constraints, but they “provide
far better opportunities for leadership than arrogant demonstra-
tions of contempt for others’ views.”38 Acting through multilateral
channels may prove advantageous for both America and its allies
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in the long run. At the very least, it would add a degree of legiti-
macy to the actions of states like Australia and may make at least
one aspect of the bilateral relationship less contentious by giving
the actions of both the United States and Australia wider interna-
tional support. It might also go some way to making Australia’s
international position less isolated and regional relations less frac-
tious. Indeed, there are potentially important benefits for both
Australia and the United States from Australia assuming a more
independent position in the region and the world. The “coalition
of the willing” is predominantly a group of Anglo-American coun-
tries closely associated with American hegemony: an Australia that
was renowned for its independence rather than its automatic, un-
critical support of all things American would add much greater
legitimacy to similar activities in the future. A more independent
Australian foreign policy might have domestic spinoffs as well: if
the alliance were a less central part of Australia’s overall position,
it would make it less contentious, and less susceptible to partisan
political change in both Australia and the United States.
If the political stock of some of redoubtable American allies
like Howard in Australia and Blair in Britain are seen to fall as a
consequence of too close and uncritical association with what is
increasingly perceived internationally to be an overbearing and
unpopular American administration,39 then this bodes badly for
the future of American leadership of the international system. As
Joseph Nye has famously argued, American power is multi-dimen-
sional;40 without some attention to its “softer” aspects and a con-
certed effort to cultivate the support of broadly sympathetic nations,
American hegemony may not prove as durable, uncontested, or
beneficial as some of its admirers believe.
For the first time in three decades, an Australian government
finds itself on the defensive because of its close ties with the United
States. That this could happen in a country that has, since the end
of the Second World War, been closely wedded to America at both
an elite level and more broadly across much of the general popu-
lation, is indicative of the potentially corrosive impact of U.S.
unilateralism. The deep reservoir of goodwill toward the United
States that continues to exist—recent economic and strategic dif-
ficulties notwithstanding—suggests that Australia will continue
broadly to align itself with the United States in the immediate future.
In the longer term, this goodwill risks being steadily eroded by
American actions that appear to damage Australian interests, and
by the inescapable geographical reality that must ultimately make
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Asia, rather than America, Australia’s economic, political, and perhaps
even strategic center of gravity. Contemporary American hege-
mony, paradoxically enough, may ultimately have the effect of ac-
celerating this process.
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